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PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

Questions from Congressional Consultations

TAB 2

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Drafter

1. Will sensitive equipment from U. S. AWACS be installed on the Saudi version: U. S. government crypto gear (such as the KG-40); joint tactical information and distribution system (JTIDS); expanded command, control and communications; signal intelligence (SIGINT); additional electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM); and secure mode of identification of friend and foe (IFF)?

PM

2. Is the U. S., in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, developing special security arrangements that insure adequate protection of the AWACS aircraft including destruct capability)?

PM

3. Will any U. S. citizens participate in routine operational missions of Saudi AWACS in Saudi Arabia? Will any U. S. military personnel perform maintenance or training functions on board AWACS operational flights? Will the training of Saudi crews for the AWACS take place entirely in the United States?

EA

4. What is Saudi Arabia's manpower capacity to absorb high technology systems without additional requirements for U. S. technicians? How many U. S. military and civilian personnel are now stationed in Saudi Arabia in connection with previous sales of U. S. military hardware to that country? How many additional U. S. military and civilian personnel will be required to be stationed in Saudi Arabia if this entire package (the AWACS, F-15 enhancement, and KC-135 tankers) is approved?

EA

5. What impact would the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia have on the military stability in the region? In particular, as a potential adversary of Israel in another Middle East war, what capability would AWACS give Saudi, Syrian and possibly Jordanian air forces individually? Would this require significant purchases of counter-measures on the part of Israel to neutralize the potential offensive capability associated with AWACS?

PM

6. What other military hardware is under discussion for sale to Saudi Arabia in addition to this package (TOW's, etc.)?

PM

7. Aren't the prospects for Saudi stability as poor as Iran's were?

EA

8. What ground installations will the Saudis get with the AWACS? Will these integrate with other Arab systems?

PM

NEA

9. What geographic restrictions will be put on the Saudis operations of the AWACS? What threat is the AWACS designed to protect the Saudis from?

PM

10. Will the intelligence "take" be shared?

NEA

11. Aren't we just fomenting a new stage in the arms race in the Middle East? ✓

NEA

12. Isn't the Saudi request for AWACS being approved because they have us over the oil barrel and they seek the latest equipment whatever their real need? ✓

NEA

13. What quid have we received from the Saudis? When will the "special relationship" be tested two ways rather than one? ✓

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Saudi Enhancement/AWACS Package
Technical and Operational Questions

se drafter

IEA (a)
PM (b)

PM

NEA

PM

PM

NEA

PM

PM

NEA

1. What specific measures have been negotiated to protect sensitive US technologies sold to the Saudis? Describe their likely effectiveness and possible shortcomings.
2. What additional measures could be implemented to ensure the security of these technologies? If the Saudis wish to use foreign national technicians to maintain AWACS, how would we ensure its security?
3. Have the Saudis agreed to any specific restrictions on the use or processing of data and intelligence gathered by a Saudi AWACS?
4. What options are available for joint operation/manning of a Saudi-owned AWACS and associated ground environment? Which would be most beneficial from the standpoint of the Gulf defense generally?
5. What technical measures could be implemented to permit US control/monitoring of the Saudis' AWACS data? How effective and comprehensive would these be?
6. What options exist for limiting AWACS operations to particular zones within Saudi Arabia? Have any of these been discussed with the Saudis?
7. How effective would each of these options be in terms of limiting AWACS' effectiveness opposite Israel? Are there other options available or technical means (electronic jamming) that could limit the potential of Saudi AWACS against Israel?
8. Describe the basic or "notional" AWACS-related ground environment as it might be placed in Saudi Arabia. How would the notional ground environment and each of these alternatives affect AWACS' effectiveness or limit practical AWACS operations, particularly with regard to Israel?
9. What considerations are involved in choices about the numbers and mix of USG and US contractor support personnel required?

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- PM
- PM
- NEA
- NEA
- PM
10. Describe the specific ways in which the sale of AWACS and other enhancement items could facilitate a rapid US reinforcement of the Gulf region. What peacetime agreements, understandings, and practices would be necessary or desirable in this connection?
 11. What options exist for Saudi participation in continuing USAF AWACS deployments in Saudi Arabia? How would each affect Saudi ability to operate and maintain RSAF AWACS?
 12. What options are possible for future US-Saudi-Gulf State air defense cooperation? What role, especially, might a Saudi AWACS play in each arrangement? What other systems might be deployed elsewhere in the region as part of these arrangements? ✓
 13. Outline chronologically the process by which the US and Saudi Arabia determined that the Saudis needed AWACS (e.g., requirements for enhanced Saudi air defense, ground-based versus aerial surveillance options, E-2C versus E-3A, requirement for five E-3A). ✓
 14. How do the characteristics and performance of non-US alternative aerial surveillance aircraft (e.g., Nimrod, MOSS) compare with those of the AWACS we plan to sell to Saudi Arabia?
 15. What US-licensed or produced systems, if any, are incorporated in Nimrod?
 16. How will AWACS ownership be handled within NATO?
 17. How will the NATO AWACS be configured? How will these aircraft differ from the USAF and RSAF AWACS?
 18. How will NATO AWACS operate with other elements of the NATO air defense system (including Nimrod, MPCs, ground based radar and control facilities, interceptors, SAMS)?
 19. How many and what type of ground based radars, communications, and other facilities will be provided to the Saudis along with AWACS? What will be the function of these facilities?
 20. How would a Saudi AWACS be interoperable with US tactical aircraft? How would a Saudi AWACS be interoperable with US naval forces? How would this interoperability be lim-

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ited? How could it be enhanced? How would an RSAF AWACS compare with USAF and NATO AWACS in these respects?

- (DOD)
- PM
21. What is the basis of the Saudi requirement for AIM-9Ls? - On the basis of what requirements were 842 AIM-9Js previously approved for sale in support of Saudi F-15s? Why is the AIM-9L requirement additive to (rather than a replacement for) the Sidewinders previously approved for their F-15?
 22. If the Saudis chose to do so, could they acquire substitutes for US-made MERs from non-US sources? What countries might be capable of providing these substitutes? How effective would these substitute MERs likely be?
 23. What wiring changes could be necessary if the Saudis were to make their F-15s compatible with these substitute MERs? How difficult would it be to make these changes?
 24. Could conformal fuel tanks be successfully designed and produced by other countries? Which ones?
 25. What other countries, if any, could produce tanker aircraft compatible with the F-15?
 26. What is the IOC of the French improved R. 550 Magic Missile? How effective will this missile likely be in comparison to our AIM-9L? Would the improved R. 550 be compatible with the F-15? The F-5? If not, what changes would be necessary to these aircraft to make them compatible with the R. 550? Which other countries, if any, could produce a missile comparable to the AIM-9L?
 27. In addition to cryptographic gear, what configuration options exist (e.g., radars, computers) for the E-3A which involve utilization of less sensitive technologies? How would each option affect the effectiveness of the AWACS?
 28. What are the consequences for US readiness and other defense requirements if we continue to deploy USAF AWACS to Saudi Arabia through 1985?

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"Questions A Through P"

. . . the President shall, upon the request of such committee or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, transmit promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such request --

(A) a detailed description of the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services to be offered, including a brief description of the capabilities of any defense article to be offered;

(B) an estimate of the number of officers and employees of the United States Government and of United States civilian contract personnel expected to be needed in such country to carry out the proposed sale;

(C) the name of each contractor expected to provide the defense article, defense service, or design and construction services proposed to be sold (if known on the date of transmittal of such statement);

(D) an evaluation, prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, of the manner, if any, in which the proposed sale would --

(i) contribute to an arms race;

(ii) increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of conflict;

(iii) prejudice the negotiation of any arms controls;
or

(iv) adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States;

(E) the reasons why the foreign country or international organization to which the sale is proposed to be made needs the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services which are the subject of such sale and a description of how such country or organization intends to use such defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services;

(F) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed sale on the military stocks and the military preparedness of the United States;

(G) the reasons why the proposed sale is in the national interest of the United States;

(H) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed sale on the military capabilities of the foreign country or international organization to which such sale would be made;

(I) an analysis by the President of how the proposed sale would affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region to which the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services which are the subject of such sale would be delivered and whether other countries in the region have comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services;

(J) an estimate of the levels of trained personnel and maintenance facilities of the foreign country or international organization to which the sale would be made which are needed and available to utilize effectively the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services proposed to be sold;

(K) an analysis of the extent to which comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services are available from other countries;

(L) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on United States relations with the countries in the region to which the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services which are the subject of such sale would be delivered;

(M) a detailed description of any agreement proposed to be entered into by the United States for the purchase or acquisition by the United States of defense articles, defense services, design and construction services or defense equipment, or other articles, services, or equipment of the foreign country or international organization in connection with, or as consideration for, such letter of offer, including an analysis of the impact of such proposed agreement upon United States business concerns which might otherwise have provided such articles, services, or equipment to the United States, an estimate of the costs to be incurred by the United States in connection with such agreement compared with costs which would otherwise have been incurred, an estimate of the economic impact and unemployment which would result from entering into such proposed agreement, and an analysis of whether such costs and such domestic economic impact

(N) the projected delivery dates of the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services to be offered;

(O) a detailed description of weapons and levels of munitions that may be required as support for the proposed sale; and

(P) an analysis of the relationship of the proposed sale to projected procurements of the same item.

A certification transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall be unclassified, except that the information specific in clause (ii) and the details of the description specified in clause (iii) of subsection (a) may be classified if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental to the security of the United States.